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Abstract: Due to the intrinsic point-to-point characteristic of quantum key distribution (QKD)
systems, it is necessary to study and develop QKD network technology to provide a secure
communication service for a large-scale of nodes over a large area. Considering the quality
assurance required for such a network and the cost limitations, building an effective mathematical
model of a QKD network becomes a critical task. In this paper, a flow-based mathematical model
is proposed to describe a QKD network using mathematical concepts and language. In addition,
an investigation on QKD network topology evaluation was conducted using a unique and novel
QKD network performance indicator, the Information-Theoretic Secure communication bound,
and the corresponding linear programming-based calculation algorithm. A large number of
simulation results based on the topologies of SECOQC network and NSFNET network validate
the effectiveness of the proposed model and indicator.
© 2020 Optical Society of America under the terms of the OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement
1. Introduction
With the rapid development and increasing applicability of quantum key distribution (QKD)
technology [1–4], its intrinsic point-to-point feature [5] has become one of the major bottlenecks
limiting the scale of its application. To overcome the limitation on the quantity of nodes [6] and
communication distance, the construction of a QKD network with multiple QKD systems was
an inevitable development trend. The QKD network in this paper is defined as a network that
provides a secure communication service, utilizing the keys generated by QKD systems [7]. In
order to explore the physical feasibility of QKD networking, many practical QKD networks [8–13]
have been constructed in recent years. In the last decade, the number of nodes in existing QKD
networks has expanded from 6 [10, 14] to 56 nodes [15] and the communication distance has
extended from 19.6 [16] to 2000 km [15]. With the growing coverage and complexity of QKD
networks, effective modeling is crucial for functional verification, quality assurance, cost control,
cycle shortening, etc. [17, 18].
The two primary approaches of network modeling include simulation models and mathematical
models. Unlike traditional communication networks, the relevant research of QKD networks has
not drawn much attention [7,19–23]. In 2017, Mehic et. al. designed a QKD network simulation
model, QKDNetSim [23], based on the classical Network Simulator-version 3 [24], to evaluate
and validate a network solution at a low cost. Although QKDNetSim could simulate the key
generation and secure communication processes, it could not accurately reflect the practical
performance of a QKD network, owing to its neglect of the actual key generation capability and
volatile communication demand of the QKD network. In order to reflect the state of a practical
network, we designed a practical QKD network simulation model in our previous work [7]. In
this model, the point-to-point key generation capability was modeled by the Gottesman-Lo-
Lutkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) theory [25] and the volatile end-to-end communication demand was
modeled by the Poisson stochastic process. Although our previous work enhanced the accuracy
of the QKDNetSim, the inherent shortcomings of a simulation approach still exist, such as the
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empirical results, the difficult global optimal solution, etc.
A mathematical model, however, is a general mathematical abstraction of a QKD network,
and therefore makes it possible to theoretically evaluate the performance of a QKD network and
obtain the global optimal solution, etc. In the past two years, the problems of architecture [26],
SDN [27,28], routing [29], key management [30, 31] and key allocation [32], etc. are addressed.
However, the results of our simulation model [7] demonstrate that the performance of a practical
QKD network primarily depends on how its key generation capability satisfies the communication
demand. With emphasis on this characteristic, we are motivated to study the mathematical model
of a QKD network, and its applications.
• In this paper, a flow-based mathematical (FM) model is proposed. In the model, a QKD
network was abstracted as the graph G = (V, E, F), with the node set V , the edge set E and
the QKD-flow set F. According to the analysis of QKD network characteristics, the detailed
attributes of the node and edge were analyzed. Furthermore, the QKD-flow was defined in
reference to the generic traffic-flow [33, 34], which is a unique component of a QKD network,
compared to a classical network.
• Based on the FM model, an investigation on QKD network topology evaluation was conducted
by proposing the indicator, the Information-Theoretic Secure (ITS) communication bound, and
the corresponding linear programming-based calculation algorithm. The indicator is defined
as the optimization of all whole demand satisfactions, to theoretically quantify the optimal
performance of a QKD network topology [35]. The calculation of the ITS communication
bound was inspired by the linear programming algorithm.
• In order to verify the validity and necessity of the proposed FM model and performance
indicator, two typical topology planning tasks, based on the existing topologies of SECOQC
network [16] and NSFNET network [36], were designed and analyzed. The simulation results
demonstrated the advantages of the FM model and ITS communication bound.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, some related literature is discussed. In Section
3, the FM model is presented in detail. Based on the model, a unique QKD network performance
indicator and the corresponding linear programming-based calculation algorithm are proposed in
Section 4. In Section 5, the simulations of topology evaluation, based on the FM model, are
presented and the results are analyzed. Section 6 presents the concluding remarks.
2. Related literature
In this section, related literature is reviewed and analyzed. The construction modes, application
modes, and architecture models of a QKD network are discussed and the generic maximum-flow
problem, which is usually used for task allocation, is introduced as one of the theoretical bases of
the FM model.
2.1. Construction modes of QKD network
Construction modes used in existing QKD networks are divided into three main categories:
optical switching, quantum relay, and trusted relay [37–39]. Because an optical switching device
cannot break the scale limitation [40] and the core technique of quantum relay is still far from
mature [41, 42], the trusted relay is the most common construction mode at present.
2.2. Application modes of QKD network
Application modes used in existing QKD networks primarily include the key-by-key (also called
key relay) [22] and data-by-data (also called hop-by-hop) [23] modes. The main difference
between these modes is how the communication is established. The key-by-key mode, used
in the Tokyo network [14], can better retain the classical network protocol. However, in this
mode, the number of key pools configured for each communication node is proportional to the
number of potential communication parties. This requires a large memory capacity, which is
impractical in a large-scale QKD network. In the data-by-data mode, which was used in the
SECOQC network [43], the number of key pools for each node is only related to the degree of the
node [44]. This mode can greatly reduce the memory demand and, thus, increase the availability
of a large-scale QKD network. Therefore, the data-by-data mode is more appropriate at present.
2.3. Architecture models of QKD network
Compared to a traditional communication network, the secure communication process between
the end-to-end communication parties of a QKD network needs to consume the quantum keys
generated by the point-to-point links. Therefore, a two-layer architecture model of a QKD network
was proposed in our previous work [7], which is shown in Fig. 1. In this model, end-to-end
secure communication and point-to-point key generation proceed in the classical layer and the
quantum layer, respectively.
Fig. 1. Two-layer architecture model of a QKD network [7]
Because the point-to-point key generation capability of a QKD system is extremely limited
by the length of the quantum channel [45, 46] and is markedly lower than the capacity of the
classical channel [47], the performance of a QKD network is determined by the alignment of the
communication demand and the key generation capability. Referring to our previous work [7],
the point-to-point key generation capability of the quantum layer can be obtained by the common
calculation method used for the secure key rate of a QKD system, such as GLLP theory [25, 48]
and the universal composable framework [49]. Assuming that the double decoy state protocol
is adopted in the QKD network and the Chernoff bound [50] is used to estimate the finite code
length effect [51, 52], the key generation capability Rkey can be calculated as,
Rkey = max
{
freqRL, 0
}
, (1)
where RL represents the lower bound of the key generation capability for a photon, calculated as,
RL = −qQµ fecH
(
Eµ
)
+ qQL1
[
1 − H
(
eU1
)]
. (2)
In Eq. (2), q is the sifting coefficient, the subscript µ denotes the intensity of the signal state,
Qµ is the overall gain of a signal state, Eµ is the overall quantum bit error rate, QL1 is the lower
bound of the gain of single-photon state, eU1 is the upper bound of the error rate of a single-photon
state, fec is the error correction efficiency, and H (x) is the binary Shannon information function,
given by H (x) = −xlog2 (x) − (1 − x) log2 (1 − x) . To calculate RL , four key variables, Qµ, Eµ,
QL1 , and e
U
1 , are required. The first two can be directly measured through experiments and the
latter two can be estimated by the decoy state method [7].
2.4. The generic maximum-flow problem
Let G = (V, E) be a directed graph with node set V and edge set E . The graph G = (V, E) is a
flow network [53] if it has two distinguished nodes, a source s ∈ V , a sink t ∈ V , and a positive
real-valued capacity c (u, v) for each edge (u, v) ∈ E .
Definition 1: A traffic-flow f onG is a non-negative function, ranging over all edges (u, v) ∈ E ,
satisfying the following constraints [54]:
(i) Capacity constraint
f (u, v) ≤ c (u, v) , ∀ (u, v) ∈ E . (3)
(ii) Flow conservation ∑
v∈V
f (u, v) −
∑
v∈V
f (v, u) = 0, ∀u ∈ V − {s, t} . (4)
Total value of a traffic-flow, [[ f ]], is defined as the total difference between the flows into and
out of the sink t [55], i.e.,
[[ f ]] =
∑
u∈V
[ f (u, t) − f (t, u)]. (5)
The maximum-flow problem aims to compute the maximum value of [[ f ]] for a given network
and it is commonly discussed in the fields of the task assignment, logistics networks, urban
planning, etc.
In the context of a communication network, there are usually multiple concurrent communica-
tion pairs, in the form of calls or connections [56]. Therefore, the performance evaluation of a
communication network is significantly more complicated than solving the maximum-flow prob-
lem. The classical solving algorithms for themaximum-flow problem, such as Ford-Fulkerson [57]
and Edmonds-Karp [58], cannot be directly applied.
3. Flow-based mathematical model
With the increase in the coverage and complexity of existing QKD networks, it is beneficial
to design an effective model for functional verification, quality assurance, cost control, cycle
shortening, etc. In this section, a FM model is proposed. The “flow” does not refer to the generic
traffic-flow, but the QKD-flow, which will be defined in 3.3.
By abstracting the communication party and trusted relay as nodes, the communication link
as the edge, and the traffic volume as theQKD-flow, the definition of aQKDnetwork is given below.
Definition 2: A QKD network is modeled as a graph G = (V, E, F), where V , E and F are the
sets of nodes, edges, and QKD-flows, respectively.
3.1. Node attributes
As a communication network, the most important task of a QKD network is to satisfy the
communication demand between node pairs. The concept of connection is used to mathematically
describe the communication demand.
Definition 3: In the QKD network G = (V, E, F), a connection ki j =
(
si, tj
) (
si ∈ V, tj ∈ V
)
indicates the communication demand between the node pair
(
si, tj
)
[59], where si is a source
and tj is a sink.
Let K =
{(
si, tj
) |si ∈ V, tj ∈ V} denote all the desired connections in the QKD network.
Generally, the number of keys consumed in the communication process is determined by the
communication demand and the key consumption ratio. The node attributes are illustrated in
Table 1.
Table 1. Attributes of node si
Attributes Symbol Value
Communication demand d
(
si, tj
) [0,+∞)
Key consumption ratio β
(
si, tj
) [0, 1]
The communication demand d
(
si, tj
)
is the average communication rate required by the
connection
(
si, tj
)
. Moreover, the communication demand of the node si is denoted by d (si) ={
d
(
si, tj
) |tj ∈ V}.
The key consumption ratio β
(
si, tj
)
is the ratio of the key length to the plaintext length in the
adopted encryption algorithm. In particular, when the value of β
(
si, tj
)
is 1, it indicates that a
One-Time-Pad (OTP) algorithm [60] was adopted to achieve secure communication. When the
value of β
(
si, tj
)
is 0, it indicates that the adopted encryption algorithm does not require the keys
generated by the QKD systems. The key consumption ratio of the node si is therefore denoted by
β (si) =
{
β
(
si, tj
) |tj ∈ V}.
3.2. Edge attributes
Because upstream and downstream communication share channel bandwidth [61], the edge of
a QKD network is considered undirected. The undirected edge, formed by connecting nodes
um ∈ V and vn ∈ V , is denoted by (um, vn) ∈ E .
The main attribute of a QKD network lies in the fact that the key generation process requires
the participation of a quantum channel and the key generation rate is very limited by the length of
the quantum channel. In order to mathematically describe this characteristic, several important
attributes of the edge are extracted. Their symbol representations and value ranges are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2. Attributes of the edge (um, vn)
Attributes Symbol Value
Classical channel capacity c (um, vn) [0,+∞)
Key generation capability r (um, vn) [0,+∞)
Classical channel capacity c (um, vn) represents the capability of a classical channel to transmit
information. When c (um, vn) is 0, there is no classical channel on the edge (um, vn), resulting in
the infeasibility of a secure communication process.
Key generation capability r (um, vn) is related to the parameters of the QKD system configured
on the edge (um, vn). In particular, when the c (um, vn) is 0, there is no classical channel on the
edge (um, vn). Because the classical channel is required for the transmission of supplementary
information during the key exchange [62], the key generation process cannot proceed on this
edge. Suppose decoy state discrete-variable QKD systems are configured, according to Eq. (1),
the key generation capability of the edge (um, vn) is calculated as,
r (um, vn) =

Rkey, c (um, vn) , 0
0, c (um, vn) = 0.
(6)
3.3. Flow conditions
Although the concept of traffic-flow is referred to in this paper, the flow in a QKD network has
many unique features owing to the significant difference between a QKD network and generic flow
network. For example, there exist many connections and the edge owns two types of capacities.
Definition 4: In a QKD network G = (V, E, F), a QKD-flow f ∈ F is a non-negative function
ranging over all connections
(
si, tj
) ∈ K and all edges (um, vn) ∈ E , which is represented by a
symbol f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
.
Specifically, a QKD-flow f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
characterizes the net data flow from a sources si to a
sink tj on an edge (um, vn). In other words, two QKD-flows are different when their sources are
different or their sinks are different or their edges are different.
The QKD-flow set F can be written as F =
{
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
) | (si, tj ) ∈ K, (um, vn) ∈ E}.
Because the secure transmission process is organized in packets, the value of f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
must be in integer multiples of the packet size P, which is called numerical constraint and given
as,
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
P
∈ N, ∀ (um, vn) ∈ E, ∀ (si, tj ) ∈ K, (7)
where N is the set of all non-negative integers.
When the value of f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
is 0, it indicates that there is no flow of the connection(
si, tj
)
on the edge (um, vn). In addition, the secure communication process is directed, therefore,
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
is considered a directed flow. Therefore, f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
and f
(
si, tj, vn, um
)
are different. The special conditions of the QKD-flow set are analyzed below.
(i) Capacity constraint
- For all (um, vn) ∈ E , the total flow on the edge (um, vn) and its reverse edge (vn, um) must
be non-negative and less than or equal to its classical channel capacity. In addition, as an
undirected graph, the classical channel capacity is shared by upstream and downstream
flows. Thus, Eq. (8) should be satisfied.
0 ≤
∑
(si,tj )∈K
[
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
+ f
(
si, tj, vn, um
) ]
≤ c (um, vn) , ∀(um, vn) ∈ E .
(8)
- For all (um, vn) ∈ E , the total key consumption on the edge (um, vn) and its reverse edge
(vn, um) must be non-negative and less than or equal to its key generation capability.
Considering the key consumption ratio β
(
si, tj
)
, the relationship between the total flow on
the edge (um, vn) and its reverse edge (vn, um) is given by,
0 ≤
∑
(si,tj )∈K
β
(
si, tj
) [
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
+ f
(
si, tj, vn, um
) ]
≤ r (um, vn) , ∀ (um, vn) ∈ E,
(9)
(ii) Flow conservation
- For all connections
(
si, tj
) ∈ K and all non-source and non-sink nodes um ∈ V − {si, tj},
the total flow into the node um must equal to the total flow out of it, i.e.,∑
vn ∈V
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
) − ∑
vn ∈V
f
(
si, tj, vn, um
)
= 0,
∀um , si, tj, ∀ (si, tj ) ∈ K . (10)
In general, a FM model suitable for a QKD network was proposed by adding the attributes of
key consumption ratio and key generation capability and giving the definition and conditions of
QKD-flows. As the theoretical foundation of topology evaluation and design, routing evaluation
and design, QKD systems selection, and construction cost control, the FM model can be used not
only for the construction of a new QKD network, but also for the optimization of existing QKD
networks.
4. FM model based topology evaluation
To construct a high performance QKD network, designing a precise topology evaluation scheme
is one of the most important tasks. An investigation on QKD network topology evaluation
was conducted, based on the FM model. Firstly, the ITS communication bound indicator was
designed to mathematically describe the quality of QKD network topology. In addition, a linear
programming-based calculation algorithm is proposed to obtain the quantitative quality.
4.1. The description of topology quality
To eliminate the influence of the encryption algorithm on the topology evaluation, an OTP
algorithm [60], which can provide an ITS communication service, is adopted in this section.
Hence, for all
(
si, tj
) ∈ K , the value of β (si, tj ) is set to 1. The quality of a QKD network
topology is measured by the proposed performance indicator ITS communication bound.
For a given connection
(
si, tj
)
, similar to traffic-flow, its total value,
[[
f
(
si, tj
) ]]
, is the total
difference between the QKD-flows, which belong to the connection
(
si, tj
)
, into and out of the
sink tj , represented as,[[
f
(
si, tj
) ]]
=
∑
um ∈V,vn=tj
[
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
) − f (si, tj, vn, um) ] . (11)
Let M
(
si, tj
)
represent the connection demand satisfaction for a given connection
(
si, tj
)
,
which is the ratio of its total value to its communication demand, i.e.,
M
(
si, tj
)
=
[[
f
(
si, tj
) ]]
d
(
si, tj
) . (12)
M
(
si, tj
) ≥ 1 indicates that the communication demand of this connection (si, tj ) is satisfied.
Then, let’s calculate all connection demand satisfactions for all connections. Next, let’s obtain
the minimum value from all connection demand satisfactions. This minimum value can be
used to represent a whole demand satisfaction of the given QKD network. Obviously, each
possible QKD-flow set corresponds to a specific whole demand satisfaction. Similar to the
generic maximum-flow problem, we can obtain the maximum value of all possible whole demand
satisfactions through the optimization of QKD-flows. This maximum value, which is called ITS
communication bound, can be used to represent the optimal performance of a QKD network with
a given topology.
Definition 5: For a QKD network with a given topology, the ITS communication bound is
defined as the optimal (maximal) whole demand satisfaction, which is defined as the minimum of
all connection demand satisfactions for all connections in K over a possible QKD-flow.
The ITS communication bound B is therefore can be calculated as,
B = max
F
ρ (F) , (13a)
ρ (F) = min
(si,tj )∈K
M
(
si, tj
)
, (13b)
where ρ (F) is the minimum value of all connection demand satisfactions when the QKD-flow set
is F.
It is clear that the communication demand for all connections are satisfied only when the value
of B is greater than 1. The larger the value of B , the higher the degree of satisfaction. It is also
significant that the gap between the performance of a specific QKD network with specific routing
protocols and specific key management strategies, and the calculation of ITS communication
bound of this QKD network can be used to evaluate the performance of the routing protocols and
key management strategies.
4.2. The calculation of topology quality
To calculate the indicator B, it is necessary to explore the optimal assignment of the QKD-flows,
which is defined as the multi-connection flow problem (MCFP) in this paper. Although the MCFP
appears to be a combination of several maximum-flow problems, the interaction of multiple
maximum-flow problems cause their respective solutions to fail [63].
With regard to the definition of the QKD-flow, the flow must satisfy the capacity constraint
and flow conservation. Therefore, the MCFP can be formulated as,
max
F
min
(si,tj )∈K
∑
um ∈V,vn=tj
[
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
) − f (si, tj, vn, um) ]
d
(
si, tj
) , (14a)
s.t. Eq. (7) , Eq. (8) , Eq. (9) , Eq. (10) . (14b)
In Eq. (14), F =
{
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
) | (si, tj ) ∈ K, (um, vn) ∈ E} are the set of decision variables.
The formulation is very similar to that of the linear programming problem. However, due to the
issues of a non-linear objective function and the non-standard data type of the decision variables,
the MCFP is not a standard linear programming problem, which is difficult to solve. To transform
this problem into standard linear programming, the original decision variable f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
must be converted into a new variable x
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
as follows:
x
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
=
f
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
P
. (15)
Therefore, X =
{
x
(
si, tj, um, vn
) | (si, tj ) ∈ K, (um, vn) ∈ E} becomes the new set of decision
variables. In addition, the original objective function is replace by a new objective function ρ (F),
by adding ρ (F) as a new decision variable and adding two constraint conditions, as follows,
ρ (F)
P
−
∑
um ∈V,vn=tj
[
x
(
si, tj, um, vn
) − x (si, tj, vn, um) ]
d
(
si, tj
) ≤ 0, ∀ (si, tj ) ∈ K, (16a)
ρ (F) ∈ R+0 , (16b)
where R+0 is the set of non-negative real numbers.
According to the above operations, the MCFP is transformed into an equivalent standard mixed
integer linear-programming problem, which is formulated as:
max
X
ρ (F) (17a)
s.t. 0 ≤
∑
(si,tj )∈K
x
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
+
∑
(si,tj )∈K
x
(
si, tj, vn, um
) ≤ c (um, vn)
P
, ∀ (um, vn) ∈ E,
(17b)
0 ≤
∑
(si,tj )∈K
x
(
si, tj, um, vn
)
+
∑
(si,tj )∈K
x
(
si, tj, vn, um
) ≤ r (um, vn)
P
, ∀ (um, vn) ∈ E,
(17c)∑
vn ∈V
x
(
si, tj, um, vn
) − ∑
vn ∈V
x
(
si, tj, vn, um
)
= 0, ∀um , si,tj, ∀ (si, tj ) ∈ K, (17d)
ρ (F)
P
−
∑
um ∈V,vn=tj
[
x
(
si, tj, um, vn
) − x (si, tj, vn, um) ]
d
(
si, tj
) ≤ 0, ∀ (si, tj ) ∈ K, (17e)
x
(
si, tj, um, vn
) ∈ N, ∀ (um, vn) ∈ E, ∀ (si, tj ) ∈ K, (17f)
ρ (F) ∈ R+0 . (17g)
In order to solve this problem, a linear programming solver [64], Gurobi [65], was adopted.
In the formulation, r (um, vn) represents the key generation capability of a QKD system. It is
important to note that many types of QKD systems can be adopted into the QKD network and
the corresponding topology quality can be obtained by changing the calculation of r (um, vn).
5. Simulation results and analysis
5.1. Simulation design
The design of this simulation consisted mainly of the design of the parameters for communication
demand, QKD systems, packet size, and classical channel capacities. These parameters will
directly affect the topology performance of a specific QKD network. During the simulation,
typical topologies of a SECOQC and NSFNET network were adopted.
To simplify the analysis, the communication demand between any two different nodes in the
simulation was assumed to be the same, denoted as d, i.e.,
K =
{(
si, tj
) |si ∈ V, tj ∈ V, si , tj} , (18a)
d
(
si, tj
)
=

d,
(
si, tj
) ∈ K,
0,
(
si, tj
)
< K .
(18b)
Given that the discrete-variable QKD protocol is one of the most practical QKD protocols and
that the decoy state method is critical to security assurance, a decoy state discrete-variable QKD
system was adopted in this simulation. To simplify analysis, the parameters of all QKD systems
were assumed to be the same. To facilitate a comparison with the performance reported in the
literature [7], the same parameters of QKD system, listed in Table 3, and the same packet size,
that is, P = 500 bytes, were adopted in this simulation.
In Table 3, freq is the repetition rate, q is the sifting coefficient, α is the fiber attenuation
coefficient, ηBob is the transmittance of Bob, edet is the intrinsic error rate due to misalignment
and instability of the optical system, µ is the intensity of signal state, ν is the intensity of decoy
state, φ is the intensity of vacuum state, Y0 is the background rate, e0 is the error rate of the
background, fec is the error correction efficiency, Nµ is the number of signal pluses sent by Alice,
Nν is the number of decoy pluses sent by Alice, Nφ is the number of vacuum pluses sent by Alice,
ς is the security bound.
Table 3. Parameters of QKD systems [7]
freq q α ηBob edet µ ν φ Y0 e0 fec Nµ Nν Nφ ς
1GHz 0.9 0.2dB/km 0.1 0.01 0.4 0.1 0 2.1E-5 0.5 1.15 1.6E10 2E9 2E9 5.73E-7
Because classical optical fiber communication technology is sufficiently mature [66, 67], the
classical channel capacities of all the edges were set to 1 Gbps, i.e.,
c (um, vn) = 1 Gbps, ∀ (um, vn) ∈ E . (19)
5.2. Topology evaluation based on QKD systems placement
A typical task undertaken as part of network topology planning involves investigating how to
effectively enhance the network performance by adding just one system to existing topology.
In the context of a QKD network, the equivalent task involves finding out how to effectively
enhance the QKD network performance by adding a QKD system to an existing QKD network
topology. When the new QKD system is added, which is equivalent to adding a new edge to
existing topology, a modified topology is actually formed.
It is well known that the key generation process is reliant on the optical fiber. Therefore, a
QKD system can function only when placed on the existing edge. In addition, adding a QKD
system to the edge (um, vn) results in an increase in the key generation capability of this edge and
its reverse edge, r (um, vn) and r (vn, um). Due to the different link distances, the key generation
capabilities of a given QKD system will vary depending on the edge on which it is placed. In
addition, due to the different traffic burdens of edges within the overall network, any given QKD
system will produce different gains in communication security depending on the edge on which
it is placed.
To verify validity of the proposed FM model and performance indicator, a network topology
of the SECOQC network, which is shown in Fig. 2, was selected. The numbers on the edges in
the figure represent the link distances in kilometers.
Fig. 2. Topology of SECOQC network [7]
To determine the optimal placement scheme, the QKD system is placed at every possible edge
in a SECOQC network, to form eight modified topologies. To quantitatively evaluate different
placement schemes, the ITS communication bounds of the original SECOQC topology and the
eight modified SECOQC topologies were calculated. The results are listed in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that the ITS communication bound increased and the communication demand
switched from unsatisfied to satisfied when the QKD system was placed on edge e1. This
indicates that edge e1 acts as a bottleneck in the topology of the SECOQC network, which is
consistent with the performance results in the literature [7].
Table 4. Performance comparison of original SECOQC topology and modified
SECOQC topologies (d = 25 Kbps)
Placement none e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8
Bound 0.96 1.92 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
If we observe the original SECOQC topology in Fig. 2, we can see that the length of edge
e1 is 85 km. By substituting this length into Eq. (2), the calculated key generation capability
is about 233 Kbps. However, as a “bridge” [68] in the topology, no matter which routing
algorithm is adopted, the keys generated on edge e1 must satisfy the communication demand for
ten connections (s1, t2), (s1, t3), (s1, t4), (s1, t5), (s1, t6), (s2, t1), (s3, t1), (s4, t1), (s5, t1) and (s6, t1) .
Thus, when the communication demand is set to 25 Kbps, the ITS communication bound can be
calculated as 233/(25*10) ≈ 0.93. In addition, when the addition QKD system is placed on the
edge e1, the modified ITS communication bound can be calculated as (233*2)/(25*10) ≈ 1.86.
The alignment between this calculation and the result shown in Table 4 is due to the numerical
constraint of QKD-flow.
It is clear that the distances corresponding to the other edges are significantly shorter than
edge e1, which is conducive to a higher key generation capability. As the traffic burden is eased,
only one QKD system placed on these edges will not exhibit a more significant performance
improvement. The validity of the FM model and the ITS communication bound indicator is
verified.
5.3. Topology evaluation based on intermediate nodes selection
Given that above results are too obvious to prove the validity of the research, another simulation
based on intermediate nodes selection was designed to further verify the necessity of the proposed
model and indicator.
Nodes selection, investigating how to effectively enhance the network performance by adding
several intermediate nodes and corresponding edges to existing topology, is also a typical task in
network topology planning. Since a QKD network based on trusted relay mode requires every
node in the topology to be trusted, the addition of each new node will reduce the security of this
QKD network. Therefore, compared with a classical network, nodes selection is more important
for a QKD network. To verify necessity of the proposed FM model and performance indicator, a
complicated topology of the NSFNET network, which is shown in Fig. 3, was designed.
Three gray nodes in Fig. 3 are optional nodes with no communication demand. In contrast,
every pair of other nodes have the same communication demand. A dotted line in the figure
represents an optional edge that connects one or two optional nodes. To simplify analysis, this
simulation assumed that an optional edge is selected if and only if the nodes at both ends of this
edge are selected. In addition, the same parameters for communication demand, QKD system,
packet size, and classical channel capacities were adopted.
Fig. 3. Topology of NSFNET network
To determine the optimal selection scheme, different combinations of the three optional nodes
form eight different topologies, as shown in Fig. 4. To quantitatively evaluate different selection
schemes, the ITS communication bounds under eight different topologies were calculated. The
results are listed Table 5.
Table 5. Performance comparison under eight different topologies (d = 15 Kbps)
Selection none v8 v10 v12 v8, v10 v8, v12 v10, v12 all
Bound 0.104 0.104 1.642 0.104 2.352 0.104 1.642 2.352
For ease of presentation, we use Bound(X) to denote the value of ITS communication bound
when the selection is X . As listed in Table 5, Bound(v10) > 1 and Bound(v8) = Bound(v12) =
Bound(none) < 1.Therefore, to meet the communication demand, only adding node v10 is the
best selection. In contrast, only adding node v8 or only adding node v12 does not yield any
performance gains. In addition, Bound(v8, v10) > Bound(v10). That is, on the basis of adding
node v10, adding node v8 will produce more performance gains. However, Bound(v12, v10) =
Bound (v10), Bound(v12, v8) = Bound (v8) and Bound(all) = Bound(v8, v10). Therefore, in any
case, the addition of node v12 does not bring any performance gains.
In general, only adding node v10 can meet the communication demand. On this basis, adding
node v8 will further enhance the whole demand satisfaction. However, the addition of node v12
does not bring any performance gains. This conclusion cannot be intuitively inferred. Therefore,
the necessity of proposed FM model and ITS communication bound indicator is verified.
6. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a flow-based mathematical model of a QKD network. The major
contributions of this study include: (I) The FM model was proposed by modeling a QKD network
as a graph with nodes, edges, and QKD-flows; (II) Based on the created model, a unique QKD
network performance indicator was proposed and the corresponding linear programming-based
calculation algorithm was designed; (III) The validity and necessity of the proposed FM model
and performance indicator were verified through subtly designed simulations addressing two
typical topology planning tasks. This study provide us with the means to explore new possibilities
in the area of QKD networking and promote the development of QKD networking technology.
The FM model proposed in this paper can be used for the networking of all kinds of point-
to-point QKD protocols, such as BB84-QKD protocol and GG02-QKD protocol. However,
some QKD protocols that need to set up a third party, such as MDI-QKD protocol and TF-QKD
protocol, cannot be supported. In the future, we will continue to study the networking of such
non-point-to-point QKD protocols. In addition, a decoy state discrete-variable QKD protocol
was selected in the simulation of this paper. However, it is well known that there are many kinds
of QKD protocols that have been put to practical use. In the process of network construction, to
control the construction cost, it is necessary to select a reasonable QKD protocol according to
the specific application. The FM model can be used to guide the selection of QKD systems by
accurately calculating the network topology performance when parameters are set. However, the
iterative method for network construction is not sufficiently efficient because it incurs a selection
process ultimately leading to the selection of the best case. In our future research, it will be
necessary to further consider the relationship between the QKD protocol, link distance, topology,
and other factors to propose an efficient and adaptive construction scheme.
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